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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

CORPORATIONS - DIRECTORS - VALIDITY OF BY-LAW PERMITIING REMOVAL
OF DIRECTORS WITHOUT CAUSE -A by-law of defendant, a Delaware corporation, permitted removal of a director with or without cause by a majority
vote of the stockholders.1 The certificate of incorporation provided for a
staggered board system which divided the board of directors into three
groups, the term of one group expiring at each annual meeting. At a special
stockholders' meeting three directors were removed without cause. Plaintiff, majority stockholder of the corporation, instituted an action to determine the validity of the removal. Held, the three directors were improperly
removed since the by-law which allowed removal without cause was inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation and therefore void. Essential

1 The by-law involved in the principal case had become a common one for Delaware
corporations and was generally thought, by the bar of that state, to be valid. Proceedings
at the Annual Meeting of the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law IO Bus.
LA.w 9, 10-11 (1954).
'
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Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Products, Inc., 159 A.2d 288 (Del. Ch.
1960).
In deciding this case, the court stated that the issue involved was one
of construction only.2 However, this statement of the issue raises two difficulties. First, the court appears to have overlooked at least one essential
difference between the certificate of incorporation and the by-laws. In
Delaware the certificate of incorporation is required to set forth only a
minimal amount of information which primarily concerns the corporation's
external relations with the state.3 The by-laws, on the other hand, are
intended to supplement the certificate by filling in its skeletal structure with
details governing the internal relationships of the members, directors, and
officers of the corporation.4 Therefore, the fact that the certificate does not
authorize the removal of directors by the stockholders does not necessarily
support the inference that the incorporators intended that the directors be
immune from this form of stockholder control. Secondly, by laying the
cornerstone of this decision on the issue of construction only, the court has
chosen a logically unsound foundation. If the issue in this case actually
involves construction only, the validity of a by-law which authorized the
removal of directors for cause, when tested by the same criteria, would also
be in jeopardy, for the court's construction seemed to be premised upon
the fact that the by-law placed a limitation upon the director's tenure which
was not specifically authorized by the certificate of incorporation. Moreover, this standard would also invalidate a by-law which allowed the removal
of a member of a non-staggered board. Yet it appears settled that stockholders do have the right to remove a director for good cause, and to express
this right in by-law form.11
Actually, the Delaware court was deciding not a problem of construction,
but rather a policy conflict between greater stockholder control of the board
and the desire for maximum stability in corporate management. The Delaware statuteso neither permit nor deny to stockholders the right to remove
directors, with or without cause, although one statute contains language
which seems to contemplate the possibility of removal of a director before
Principal case at 290.
In particular, the Delaware statute requires only that the certificate of incorporation
set forth the name of the corporation; the principal office or place of business, and the
name of the resident agent; the nature of the business to be carried on; the amount of
authorized stock, and if more than one class of stock is to be issued, the po,\·ers and
privileges of each class; the names and addresses of the incorporators; the duration of the
corporation's existence; and whether the private property of the stockholders is to be
subject to payment of corporate debts. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1953).
4 The statutes of several states expressly provide that the by-laws shall stipulate
whether or not the stockholders shall possess the removal power; see, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 57.185 (1955); TE.x. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.32 (1956); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 31-1-20 (1955).
u Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957); Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336
Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939); In the Matter of Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 178 N.E. 545 (1931); Fox
v. Cody, 141 Misc. 552, 252 N.Y. Supp. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Toledo Traction, Light &
Power Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-517 (1953).
2
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the expiration of his term.7 Only the New York courts have previously
faced the issue of removal without cause without the aid of e..xpress statutory
provision for such removal. The New York courts have consistently upheld
the right of stockholders to adopt a by-law permitting the removal of directors at any time, with or without cause.8 These decisions rest upon the
premise that the denial of this right to stockholders tends to result in the
denial of adequate stockholder control over the policy-making body of the
corporation.9
The court in the principal case argued that the exercise of the power
granted in this by-law would frustrate the "plan and purpose" behind the
staggered board system.10 With this rather expansive statement, the court
has, in effect, concluded that the section of the Delaware corporation law
which permits classification of the board contains a legislative policy prohibiting, at least in the absence of an express provision in the certificate,
stockholder removal of directors without cause. There is no language in
this statute, or in any other Delaware statute, which would support this conclusion. In so deciding, the court ignored the fact that the defendant corporation was the product of a merger, and that the merger agreement constituted a contract between the stockholders of the constituent corporations.
In this agreement the parties contracted both to classify the board of directors of the new corporation and to reserve for themselves, in a by-law, an
effective form of control over the board. Only a very clear statement of
legislative policy should be allowed to nullify the provisions of this contract.
The avowed purpose of the classified directorate is to preserve continuity
of management; this can be obtained only by the sacrifice of a certain
degree of stockholder control over the board.11 Contrary to the court's reaction, it can be argued that where a corporation has classified its board of
directors, the stockholders' removal power might produce an appropriate
balance of power between the board and the stockholders. The state legislatures in the past have not proved to be effective catalysts in the solution
of this problem, though there now appears to be a legislative trend toward
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (1953) provides in part: "Vacancies and newly created
directorships ... may be filled by a majority of the directors then in office ••• and the
directors so chosen shall hold office until the next annual election and until their successors
are duly elected and qualified, unless sooner displaced . ••." (Emphasis added.)
s In the Matter of Singer, 189 Misc. 150 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc.
210, 281 N.Y. Supp. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935); In the Matter of Schwartz, 119 Misc. 387, 196 N.Y.
Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1922). These cases would seem to be peculiarly applicable to the
principal case since neither New York nor Delaware provide a statutory scheme for removal of directors, while both states permit classification of boards of directors.
9 General stockholder apathy prevents effective utilization of this control device.
However, its existence is important where majority control shifts, or changes hands altogether between annual elections.
10 Principal case at 291.
11 Additionally, a staggered board may effectively sterilize the ability of minority interests to gain representation on the board through cumulative voting. See Sell & Fuge, Impact
of Classified Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting,
17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 151 (1956).
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protection and expansion of the stockholder democracy.12 In the absence
of any indication from the court's opinion that the removal power has been
abused in those instances when it has been exercised,13 it is suggested that
the Delaware court has exceeded the limits of judicial restraint in striking
down this by-law. If, as the court said,14 "reasonable predictability in our
business society" is of such paramount importance that it must prevail over
the interests of the owners of the corporation, then it is for the legislature
to make this decision by expressly denying to the stockholders the power to
remove directors without cause.
Timothy F. Scanlon

12 The statutes of eighteen states now permit directors to be removed by the stock.holders without cause. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 389 n.68 (1959).
Fifteen of these states also permit classification of boards of directors. Id., § 384 nn. 33-38.
In addition, twenty-one states have, by constitutional provision, made cumulative voting
for directors mandatory, and seventeen other states have adopted permissive cumulative
voting statutes. Young, TIie Case for Cumulative Yoting, 1950 WIS. L. R.Ev. 49, 54.
13 Where the power has been conferred by statute, there is little evidence that it has
been frequently used. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 57 (1951).
H Principal case at 291.

